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James Wilson: Democratic Equality. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2019, Pp. 307).  
 
 
Democracy is widely considered the most or perhaps the only legitimate form of 
government, though its precise justification is a matter of dispute. Two main lines of 
justification are that democracy is justified by the goods it reliably produces (instrumental) 
or because of it embodies respect, autonomy, public justification, equality or some other 
moral value or principle (intrinsic). Several recent influential accounts of the justification 
of democratic authority attempt to merge the two approaches by arguing that democracy 
can derive both its form and its point from a conception of equality. Democratic authority 
is justified because only democracy embodies equality of status and authority. Democracy 
is understood as a distinctively egalitarian form of government, while equality is 
understood along democratic lines.  
 
James Wilson’s Democratic Equality is not so much a defense of this justificatory strategy 
as it is a detailed working out of a specific version of it and its implications. Wilson’s goal 
is to explicate a conception of political equality that is essential to democracy, to show why 
it is valuable, and to work out its practical, institutional implications. Democracy is good 
primarily because it instantiates and supports political equality, which must also be 
understood in the context of democratic life. Wilson develops a distinctive account of 
equality, while also showing how a clearer understanding of political equality should 
inform our evaluation of democratic norms and institutions.  
 
In developing this conception of political equality, Wilson follows the lead of Tom 
Christiano, Niko Kolodny, and Daniel Viehoff in thinking that equality should be 
understood as equality of authority or status. Democracy derives its authority, on this view, 
by giving everyone equal authority or power. What this amounts to or requires, however, 
is a matter of dispute. Wilson argues that equal authority is properly understood as a 
requirement of equal, sincere consideration of the judgements of one’s fellow citizens in 
the process of democratic deliberation. 
 
Wilson makes several claims about this conception of political equality as equal 
consideration. Political equality, for instance, requires that political institutions reflect the 
publicly recognized equal status of citizens. This makes political equality a strong 
constraint on the types and forms of democratic institutional arrangements. Political 
equality should also act as an on-going regulative democratic norm. Merely implementing 
an institutional framework or decision rule that tends to distribute power equally is not 
enough, democratic institutions should be “temporally sensitive.” This amounts to a 
rejection of proceduralism with respect to implementing institutions meant to distribute 
power equally. Further, political equality entails equal appropriate “consideration,” rather 
than equal political power. This goes beyond the power to issue political commands or 
directives and includes the requirement that consideration of one’s judgements be included 
in public deliberation.  
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The core idea of the book is that “equal political standing amounts to being in an ongoing 
political relationship of equality with other citizens” (6). The defense of political equality 
as an “ongoing relationship” is probably the most distinctive aspect of the approach 
defended here. This relationship of equality entails that we “recognize each citizen as 
equally entitled to render authoritative judgements as to how to organize and regulate all 
citizens’ common life” (49). Wilson takes the idea of a relationship between citizens quite 
literally, describing it as a form of “civic friendship.”  
 
While Wilson finds the analogy between political equality and friendship to be “intuitive 
and fairly obvious” (59), others may not. In any case, it is clear from the analogy that what 
equal consideration requires is quite demanding. Friends must take one another’s 
judgments into consideration when acting together. It is not enough for friends or citizens 
to engage in sincere deliberation; to give adequate consideration means sometimes 
deferring to the judgements of another even when doing so would involve something that 
the others prefer not to do (58-59).  
 
Even if we accept this account of friendship, we might question how a personal relationship 
like friendship can really be extended the largely impersonal realm of democratic politics. 
Nothing remotely resembling friendship would be an accurate description of the 
relationship that most legislators and citizens have to one another in any existing 
democracy, past or present. In a society of friends, democracy is unnecessary and, 
assuming that decisions are not made by unanimous assent, friendship does not adequately 
characterize the relationship between political actors. This is not exactly an objection. 
Wilson is engaged in a normative project of establishing what a well-functioning 
democracy would look like and what norms it would embody, the fact that no democracy 
has these features is not necessarily a mark against it. Nevertheless, if the conception of 
political equality that is meant to support democratic authority is so far from what we would 
expect in a real democratic society, there is a sense in which we have changed the subject 
and are no longer talking about what democracy and equality require. 
 
We should take the relation between democratic theory and practice seriously is important 
partly because Wilson is clear that he does. To that end, he spends Part III of the book 
showing how his conception of political equality can inform contemporary political debates 
about democratic norms and institutions. This part of the book is well-reasoned, and Wilson 
thinks that radical reforms are mostly not necessary to bring existing democratic 
institutions closer to his conception of political equality.  
 
There is a bit of a disconnect between the account of political equality developed in Part I 
and II and the discussion of how that political equality can inform democratic reform, 
though, and I have already hinted at why that might be so. The book is an exercise in 
political theory of the type that is neither fish nor fowl. It engages with core philosophical 
concerns at the heart of democratic theory but does not follow the arguments down to their 
foundations. It also engages with intuitional questions in democratic theory, but not at the 
level of detail that one would expect from either the formal or empirical literature. 
Whichever side of that divide you are on, you are likely to be unsatisfied by the approach 
here in some way. That said, it makes sense to go the route Wilson did. The rigor of the 
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philosophers and obsession with first principles can often seem pedantic and pointless, 
while the more empirical approach often lacks any serious engagement with the type of 
foundational issues that Wilson is rightly concerned with.  
 
One may feel somewhat unsatisfied because it is exceptionally hard to capture all aspects 
of the topic that good political theory aims at; nevertheless, everything here is well done 
and will likely inform the debate on equal political authority and democracy going forward. 
I have really only mentioned some of the main themes in this book, which is dense and full 
of insight. It is especially important insofar as it defends a conception of political equality 
based on the relational egalitarian notion of equality of status that does not cash this idea 
out in terms of equality of power. Taken as a whole, Wilson presents a thoroughly worked 
out conception of political equality as well as its relation to democracy and democratic 
institutions.   
 
John Thrasher 
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